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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
In re United Health Services Hospitals'
(decided November 4, 2004)
United Health Services Hospitals, Inc. (UHS) petitioned
under Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law2 for the appointment
of the Broome County Commissioner of Social Services as
guardian for the "person and property of AG, an alleged
incapacitated person (AIP).3

An Article 81 hearing seeks to

promote the welfare of an incapacitated person by establishing a
system for the appointment of a guardian who will have control of
the personal or proprietary matters of the AIP in a manner which is
"tailored to the individual needs of that person."4 At trial, AG was
called as a witness and sought to invoke his Fifth Amendment
right not to testify against himself in cases where a deprivation of
liberty was at stake.6 The court stated that the "right to remain
silent [in] . . . an Article 81 hearing [was] a matter of first
' 785 N.Y.S.2d 313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
§ 81.21 (Consol. 2004) provides in pertinent part: "[The]
court may authorize the guardian to exercise those powers necessary and
sufficient to manage the property and financial affairs of the incapacitated
person; to provide for the maintenance and support of the incapacitated person,
and those persons depending upon the incapacitated person; to transfer a part of
the incapacitated person's assets to or for the benefit of another person on the
ground that the incapacitated person would have made the transfer if he or she
had the capacity to act."
3 UnitedHealth Services, 785 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
4 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 81.01 (Consol. 2004) which states in pertinent part:
"[T]he purpose of [the] act [is] to promote the public welfare by establishing a
guardianship system which is appropriate to satisfy either personal or property
management needs of an incapacitated person in a manner tailored to the
individual needs of that person..."
5 U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part: "No person shall ... be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. ...
."
2 N.Y. MENTAL HYG.
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impression in New York." 7 The court, using state and federal
authority, analogized an AlP to a juvenile, and considered
instances where mentally incapacitated persons were afforded
specific liberty interests, to reach its holding that "[iut is inherently
offensive . . . to require a person to testify against himself or
herself in a proceeding where that person's liberty is at stake."'
When the initial petition for the appointment for a guardian
was filed, AG did not take the usual affirmative steps associated
with an appointment. He did not answer the petition or place his
condition in issue. When the trial started, he neither called any
witnesses nor waived any of his civil rights or privileges.'

During

trial, a UHS discharge planner testified that within the past year
and a half "AG had been admitted to the hospital over 25 times and
had signed himself out against medical advice 16 times." 0 When
AG was called as a witness, his attorney objected stating, among
other things, that "[t]he Fifth Amendment [provided for a] right not
to testify when a liberty interest is at stake.""
In In re Gault, the United States Supreme Court held that
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is also
applicable to the states.' 2 In Gault, a petition was filed for the
release of a fifteen-year-old boy who had been adjudicated as a
juvenile delinquent and was being institutionalized in the State
6 United Health Services,

785 N.Y.S.2d at 313.

71d

'Id at 317.
91d at 313.
1° Id

" United Health Services, 785 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss1/20
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Industrial School. 13 The boy was taken into custody for calling a
neighbor and making lewd, offensive and indecent remarks while
he was still on probation for a prior offense. 4 When the boy was
picked up by the police, no one was at home and the parents were
not notified that the child was being taken into custody. 5 Only
eight hours later, when the boy's mother returned from work and
realized that her son was not home, did she discover from a
neighbor that he had been taken into custody. 6 The next day, the
boy, his mother, his brother and two probation officers came
before the juvenile judge in chambers."' When questioned about
the telephone call, there was conflicting testimony between the
boy's and the probation officer's testimony."' The boy claimed
that he only dialed the number of the complainant and then gave
the phone to the

other boy

charged with lewd conduct."

Conversely, Probation Officer Flagg claimed that the boy admitted
making the remarks himself.2" Ultimately, at the habeas hearing
nearly two months later, the judge was called as a witness and
testified that the boy had made some of the lewd statements and
the court committed Gault to the State Industrial School as a
juvenile delinquent through the "period of his minority."'"
12

The

387 U.S. 1 (1967).

13Id.at4.
14id.

" 1d.at5.

16 Id.
17Gault, 387

U.S. at 5

" Id.at6.
19 Id.

20 Id.
21

Id. at 7-8.
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Gault family filed for a writ of habeas corpus which was initially
dismissed by both the Superior Court and Supreme Court of
Arizona.22 The Supreme Court considered whether the Supreme
Court of Arizona mistakenly held that "due process of law is
requisite to the constitutional validity of proceedings in which a
court reaches the conclusion that a juvenile has ...

misbehaved

with the consequence that he is committed to an institution in
which his freedom is curtailed.

23

Considering the argument against the application of the
right to silence in juvenile proceedings, the Gault Court analogized
admissions of juveniles with the privilege of self incrimination
stating that "the privilege against self incrimination is ... related to
the question of the safeguards necessary to assure that admissions
'or confessions are reasonably trustworthy.

24

One argument

against giving juveniles the right to silence, is that "juvenile
proceedings are 'civil' and not 'criminal[.]'

"25

The Court noted

that the "statement of the privilege in the Fifth Amendment ...

is

applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment"
and is appropriate in a civil case as well as a criminal case.26 The
Supreme Court said that "the availability of the privilege does not
turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked,
but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure

Gault, 387 U.S. at 9-10.
1d. at 12.
24
1d. at 47.
21 Id. at 49.
22

23

26 id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss1/20
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The Court reasoned that juveniles should have

a right to silence in proceedings ultimately leading to the
determination

of delinquency

because

a

classification

of

delinquency may lead to commitment in a state institution.
"[C]ommitment is a deprivation of liberty [and is] incarceration
against one's will, [regardless of] whether it is called 'criminal' or
'civil.' ",29 Because the Federal Constitution states that "no person
shall be 'compelled' to be a witness against himself when he is
threatened with deprivation of his liberty," a juvenile should have
the right to remain silent in actions in which his liberty is at stake.30
The court in United Health Services analogized the
situation with AG to that in In re Gault.

The New York

Constitution contains a privilege which prevents a person from
being forced to testify against himself ' and has "incorporated [the
provision] as a rule of evidence.

32

Civil Practice Laws and Rules

Section 4501 states that "a witness [is not required] to give an
answer which will tend to accuse himself of a crime or to expose
him to a penalty or forfeiture.

3

In an Article 81 proceeding, in

which a guardian is appointed for an AIP, that guardian has the

27 Gault, 387

U.S. at 49.

28 id
29

Id at 50.

30 id.

31 N.Y.

CONST. art. 1,§ 6 provides in pertinent part: "No person shall ...be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ..
32 United HeathServices, 785 N.Y.S.2d.
at 314.
3 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4501 (McKinney 2004).
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
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power, among other things, to place the AlP in a nursing home or
residential care facility. 4
Because this was a matter of first impression in New York
State, the court in United Health Services looked to sister courts
for guidance. The issue in United Health Services was identical to
that in In re Matthews."

In Matthews, the Oregon Court of

Appeals sought to determine whether "an allegedly mentally ill
person has a right to remain silent in a civil commitment
proceeding.36 Although stating that an ALP can "assert his Fifth
Amendment privilege in civil commitment proceeding whenever
his testimony might implicate him in a criminal matter,"37 the court
was not inclined to extend that same privilege in a hearing based
on a civil commitment."

The court deemed that the "procedural

and substantive safeguards which [were] presently afforded
allegedly mentally ill persons in commitment hearings" were
sufficient to prevent an "erroneous deprivation of [a liberty]
interest.''3

Likewise, in Tyars v. Finner4

a factually similar

California case, the court was faced with an issue identical to that
in Matthews. In Tyars, a mentally retarded person was found by
the court to be "incapable of understanding the customary oath, but
[able to] understand the importance of telling the truth."'"
34 UnitedHealth Services, 785 N.Y.S.2d
3'613 P.2d 88 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).

The

at 316.

Ild.at 89.
Id. at 90.
38
Id at 91.
39 d
37

40 518 F. Supp. 502 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
41 Id. at

503.
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be consistent with current federal

constitutional standards to apply the Fifth Amendment safeguard
against self-incrimination to petitioner Tyars' situation."42
The New York Court of Appeals has consistently held that
a "person retains his or her civil rights in a proceeding where
personal liberty is at stake."43 In Rivers v. Katz, the court was asked
to consider "whether and under what circumstances the State may
forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill patient
who has been involuntarily confined to a State facility.""

The

court held that where a patient refuses to consent to taking
antipsychotic drugs, "there must be a judicial determination of
whether the patient has the capacity to make a reasoned decision
with respect to proposed treatment before the drugs may be
administered" and therefore the patient should be afforded a de
novo trial because he or she has a liberty interest and is thus
entitled to representation by counsel.45

Similarly, the court in

United Health Services stated that "[i]f patients do not lose their
rights to make their own decision regarding administration of
antipsychotic drugs,... AIP's should not lose to a guardian their

rights to make their own medical decisions."46

The Court of

Appeals in In re St. Luke's," held that the "ALP was entitled to

42

Id. at 509.

43Rivers

v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1987).

441d.at 339.

45

46

47

Id. at 343-44.
United Health Services, 785 N.Y.S.2d at 316.

in re St. Luke's, 675 N.E.2d 1209 (N.Y. 1996).
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assigned counsel" which shall be funded by the locality.48 The
United Health Services court reasoned that "[i]f an AIP has a right
to counsel, he or she should also have the right to remain silent on
the advice of that counsel."4 9
Therefore the court in United Health Services held that an
AIP cannot be compelled to testify against himself in an Article 81
hearing, especially if a liberty interest is at stake. 0 Its rationale was
that:
in Article 81 proceedings, the AIP can be deprived
of liberty. If the evidence warrants, the guardian
can be given the power to place the incapacitated
person involuntarily in a nursing home or other
institution, to make medical decisions for him or
her, including the power to withhold or withdraw
life sustaining treatment.5
The issue of whether an allegedly incapacitated person has
a right to remain silent during a trial or hearing is a novel one, not
only in New York, but across the country.

The United States

Supreme Court has not yet reached a conclusion on the issue;
therefore the lower courts have no guidance on how to rule when
presented with this matter. In Gault, the United States Supreme
Court stated that any kind of commitment is a deprivation of
liberty and that no person should be compelled to testify against
himself when there is a threat that his liberty will be taken away. 2
4

Id. at 1210.
United Health Services, 785 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
50
Id. at 317.
1 Id. at 316.
52 In re Gault, 387 U.S.1, 50 (1967).
49
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In summation, the court in the instant case stated that "it
[was] inherently offensive to [the] Constitution and due process to
require a person to testify against himself or herself in a
proceeding where that person's liberty is at stake."53 From the time
of the creation of the Bill of Rights, the Fifth Amendment right
against self incrimination has stood as one of the most important
liberty interests provided to American citizens. The Gault court
reinforced that infallible right by holding that the same also applied
in a civil juvenile proceeding. The United Health Services court
concluded that it logically followed that the right to remain silent
could not be deprived in a "proceeding[] where a person's life and
liberty is at risk due to allegations of mental illness or incapacity..
*[and] [d]ue process requires nothing less."54

Kristen Kelekian

53 United Health Services, 785 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
54

Id. at 317.
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United States ConstitutionAmendment IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
andparticularlydescribingthe place to be searched,and the
persons or things to be seized
New York ConstitutionArticle I, Section 12:
The right of the people to be secure in theirpersons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
andparticularlydescribingthe place to be searched,and the
persons or things to be seized.
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